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The Self-Incrimination Privilege in Actions Involving
Government Regulated Enterprises
Amato v. Porter is one of several recent federal court cases deal-
ing with the privilege against self-incrimination in actions for treble
damages under the Emergency Price Control Act.' Appellant was a
wholesale distributor of bananas, and the administrator instituted
the action alleging overcharges on banana sales.2 Evidence upon
which the District Court allowed recovery for the government was
secured from records which the administrator had ordered appellant
to keep.3 The dealer claimed the privilege against self-incrimination
as to those records.4 The Circuit Court ruled for the government on
the grounds that the evidence was taken from quasi-public records
which were beyond the privilege and that since the action was reme-
dial rather than penal the privilege did not apply.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person can be compelled
to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding.5 But a
brief background illustrates the soundness of the court's position in
the Amato case. Only he who possesses the privilege can claim it.6
As to corporations, therefore, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that an official cannot invoke the privilege as to corporate records
although they are in his custody and may incriminate him.7 Nor
can it be claimed by the corporation itself.8 But if the corporate
records are in reality personal ones, the privilege applies.9 The same
reasoning is relevant as to the records of labor unions.10 The test
is whether the organization is such that it can be said to embody
common or group interests as contrasted to purely private or per-
sonal interests of its constituents."
1157 F. (2d) 719 (C.C.A. 1oth, 1946).
2 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §205 (e), 56 Stat. 34 (1942),
50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §925 (e) (1944). Under this provision, the buyer
within one year of the violation may sue the seller for treble damages;
however, if a qualified buyer fails to institute an action within thirty
days of the violation, the administrator may institute such action on be-
half of the United States within such one year period.
3 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §202(b), 56 Stat. 30 (1942),
50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §922(b) (1944). Administrator may require any-
one subject to the Act to furnish information and keep various records,
and he may subpoena them. See 7 Fed. Register 10708 and 8 Fed.
Register 5408 for such orders. §1499.12 of General Maximum Price
Regulation, in short, said that commodity or service sellers subject to
regulation should keep the customary records as to prices.
4 The Court considered the question of whether appellant was immune
from prosecution under immunity provisions of the statute: Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, §202(g), 56 Stat. 30 (1942), 50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix, §922(g) (1944) which incorporates the immunity provisions
of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443
(1893), 49 U.S.C.A. §46 (1946). That this is merely another way of
posing the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination see: Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895).
5 U.S. Const. Amend. V.
6 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2259.
7 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 66 S.Ct. 494 (1946).
8 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.
1940) §2259a. This is accepted by most courts.
9 McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906) ; Wigmore, Evidence (3rd
ed. 1940) §2259b.
10 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1943).
11 Ibid.
SELF INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
Another principle is available in the situation where Congress con-
stitutionally regulates business enterprise; namely, that designated
records of the regulated activity do not come within the privilege
against self-incrimination. 12 This does not mean, however, that the
government has complete freedom of access to those records. At
this point, the corollary problem of illegal search and seizure must
be met.13 Generally, access is secured either by permission or
through use of the administrative subpoena power which is a com-
mon provision in modern statutes.14 Such subpoenas are judicially
enforceable, but the judiciary may restrict the scope of the subpoena
issued by the administrative agency. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that Fourth Amendment objections may be encountered when
records are indiscriminately subpoenaed. 15 The evidence called for
must be material to the investigation. 16 More recent cases, how-
ever, have phrased a liberal rule in favor of the administrator. It
becomes a question of whether the evidence requested "relates or
touches" upon the matter under investigation ;17 and in a 1946 deci-
sion involving a subpoena issued under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Supreme Court held that the administrator was not to be
restricted by a forecast of the probable results of his investiga-
tions.' 8 Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the admin-
istrator may subpoena records which he has ordered to be kept.
19
But his subpoena power is subject to those judicial restraints already
indicated. 20 Of course, if the party consents to a perusal of -his
records, the illegal search and seizure objections may be avoided.
21
Assuming consent or the issuance of a judicially enforceable sub-
poena, the holding of the Amato case that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply as to quasi-public records, i.e. those
required to be kept by law, is a logical one.22 Certainly, there was
never any doubt as to public records which were the property of the
state.23 The same problem was early encountered under the Inter-
12 Amato v. Porter, 157 F. (2d) 719 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946).
13 U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
14 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §202(b) (e), 56 Stat. 30
(1942), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §922(b) (e) (1944); Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938, §§9, 11(a), 52 Stat. 1066 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§209,
211 (a) (1942); Federal Trade Commission Act, §§9, 10, 38 Stat. 722
(1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §§49, 50 (1941).
15 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 305
(1924).
16 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
17 Cudahy Packing Co. of La. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942).
18 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 66 S.Ct. 494 (1946).
19 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §202(b) (e), 56 Stat. 30
(1942), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §922(b) (e) (1944).
20 Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery, 146 F. (2d) 774 (C.C.A. 10th, 1944);
Bowles v. Cherokee Textile Mills et al, 61 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Tenn. 1945).
21 Davis v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 1256 (1946), noted 37 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 406 (1947) : consent cannot be secured through undue duress,
but duress will not be so readily implied where public documents kept
at the place of business are involved.
22 Accord. Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co. et al, 146 F. (2d) 566
(C.C.A. 9th, 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945) ; Cf. Zap v. United
States, 66 S.Ct. 1277 (1946), noted 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 406
(1947) : Court held that petitioner waived his rights as to search and
seizure objections when he agreed to permit inspection of his accounts
and records in order to obtain government business.
23 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2259c.
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,itate Commerce Act, and the Supreme Court said that records of
transactions which were subject to the regulation of Congress could
not be refused on self-incrimination grounds. 24 When the law is
constitutional, therefore, the reasoning excluding the privilege is
that the duty to keep the records rises anterior to the crime; and
the citizen is on notice that at some future time, a report must be
made.25 Practically speaking it is difficult to see how a law could
be effectively administered and violations of it punished if the rule
were to be otherwise. 26
If the second grounds for the holding in the Anato case be cor-
rect; namely, that an action for treble damages is remedial rather
than penal, it is immaterial whether the rcords upon which the
recovery was based were private or quasi-public. This follows under
the Fifth Amendment as facts involving a civil liability are not
within the privilege.2 7 Here the action was thought to be remedial
because its primary purpose was ". . . to protect the public and
effectuate a public policy sought to be accomplished by the Act."2 8
Thus phrased the test as to the nature of the action ignores the sanc-
tion of treble damages and looks essentially to the intent of Con-
gress. Congressional reports suggest that this provision was viewed
as a policing aid in that it would deter initial violations of the Act
and mitigate the enforcement duties of the government." 9 The his-
tory of the double damages section of the Fair Labor Standards Act
was before the Congress together with the knowledge that actions
thereunder had been held to be civil rather than criminal.30 Simi-
larly, such actions under the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts
are civil rather than criminal.31 The size or seeming severity of the
recovery is no conclusive clue if, indeed, a clue at all. In Marcus v.
Hess,3 2 for example, a sizable recovery was had in a qui tam pro-
ceeding after the respondent had been indicted and fined for de-
frauding the government. It was held, however, that the forfeiture
and double damages provision of the defrauding statute involved
did not constitute a criminal action placing the respondent in double
jeopardy. Although a restitutional element was present in that the
government got part of the recovery, the Court indicated that Con-
24 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. I.C.C., 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
25 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2259c.
26 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 700 (1943) : the Court said: "Bas-
ically, the power to compel the production of records of any organization,
whether it be incorporated or not, arises out of the inherent and neces-
sary power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws,
with the privilege against self-incrimination being limited to its historic
function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory in-
crimination through his own testimony or personal records."
27 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2254. Conversely, it follows that
if quasi-public records are beyond the privilege, it is immaterial whether
the action be penal or remedial.
28 Amato v. Porter, 157 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946).
29 S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 9 (1942).
30 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1062, 1069 (1938), 29
U.S.C.A. §§206 (a), 216(b) (1942); Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 121 F. (2d) 285 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941).
31 Sherman Act as amended, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. 15
(1941); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232
F. 574 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1916), Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. (2d)
417 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942).
32 317 U.S. 537 (1942).
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gressional intent and statutory construction were the essential cri-
teria as to the nature of the action.
The Congressional intent standard is clear enough in those cases
which do not transcend constitutional limitations; but on the other
hand, the mere description in the statute cannot make a civil action
out of one which is in reality a criminal one.33 In Huntington 'v.
Attrill, the Court said that the action was criminal if its purpose
were to punish an offense against the public justice of the state and
civil if designed to compensate a private party for an individual
wrong.3 4 Such tests, however, are difficult of application in penum-
bral situations.
Under the Emergency Price Control Act, the offender may be both
criminally indicted and sued for treble damages.35 One case hold-
ing a treble damage action to be penal said by way of dictum that
it, nevertheless, would not constitute a bar to a later criminal prose-
cution by the government.3 6 Legislation providing for two sanctions
for the same misconduct by criminal indictment and a civil action
for damages was common at the time of the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment.3 7 Although one senses that these civil actions are penal
in nature because of the heavy recoveries allowed,38 the existence
of a special damage to the individual aside from a general wrong
to the public seems adequate grounds for an action distinct from
the criminal one. The private wrong appears more clearly when the
individual brings the action for treble damages. But the price con-
trol cases have made no distinction on this ground.3 9 Statutory
treble damages are punitive damages. Thus punitive damages to the
injured plaintiff may be considered as an award for bringing the
wrongdoer to justice.40 It is also said that the plaintiff is securing
a gratuity from other members of the state because a wrong to the
state has been committed.41 A rationale of the Amato case where
the administrator brought the action could be that he is suing as a
representative of the consuming public which public, as an entity,
is incapable of bringing the action. The essential purpose is not
dhanged because the administrator presses the action. The public
wrong can be vindicated by independent criminal proceedings.
Robert W. Turner
33 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). Cf. Everly v. Zepp, 47
F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1944) wherein emphasis placed on statutory des-
ignation as "damages."
34 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
35 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §205(b) (e), 56 Stat. 34
(1942), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §925 (b) (e).
36 Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. S.D. 1945).
37 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942).
38 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942) ; L. P. Steuart & Bros., Inc. v.
Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944) wherein a suspension of a retail oil dealer's
operations was held to be remedial.
39 Miller v. Municipal Ct., 22 Cal. (2d) 818, 142 P. (2d) 297 (1943):
contrary to Amato case, the Court held the action to be penal whether
brought by administrator or a private party.
40 Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929).
41 McCormick, Law of Damages (1935) 277.
